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Public and private policymakers must deal
in the 1980's with the problems created by the
nation's low investment in capital goods and
heavy investment in consumption goods-with
all that that means in terms of reduced eco-
nomic growth. This issue of the Economic Re-
view analyzes two aspects of this sectoral re-
source-allocation theme. The first article
discusses the slowdown in U.S. productivity
growth as representing a prolonged failure to
allocate sufficient resources to capital invest-
ment in industry. The second article focuses on
policies toward housing and their effect on the
behavior of the market under the spur of in-
flation.
Jack Beebe and Jane Haltmaier note the
long-term nature of the slowdown in produc-
tivity, with labor productivity rising only about
one-third as fast in the 1973-78 period as it did
in the 1948-65 period. They also note the se-
rious impact of this slowdown on the nation's
living standards-evidenced by the fact that
real income perhour would double in 22 years'
time at the 1948-65 productivity growth rate,
while 58 years would be needed to double real
income at the more recent pace of productivity
increase.
Studies in the early 1970s attributed much
of the deceleration in productivity growth at
that time to shifts in employment and output
among sectors with different levels of labor
efficiency. Indeed, the early postwar shift of
workers out ofthe low-productivity farm sector
to higher productivity sectors initially boosted
aggregate U.S. productivity growth, but this
positive effect waned as the farm share of total
employment dropped steeply in recent dec-
ades.
Beebe's and Haltmaier's results show that
intersectoral labor and output shifts accounted
for only a small part of the recent slowdown
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in labor productivity. "Between the 1948-65
and 1973-78 periods, intersectoral shifts con-
tributed only 0.3 percentage points of the 2.0-
percentage-point deceleration in aggregate la-
bor-productivity growth. Moreover, sector-
specific declines became evident in nine of
twelve industrial sectors, indicating the wide-
spread nature of the productivity slowdown."
The authors show that reduced capital deep-
ening-slower growth of the capital-labor ra-
tios within sectors-was an important factor in
the labor-productivity slowdown, accounting
for one-third to one-half of the deceleration.
On an industry level, this factor was especially
important in agriculture, mining, and the large
"commercial and other" sector. They also
show that the slowdown was not limited to
labor productivity, but was evident also in total
factor productivity (involving both labor and
capital inputs).
Beebe and Haltmaier cite a number of fac-
tors that might have contributed to the slow-
down in capital investment and hence in pro-
ductivity. These factors included economic
uncertainties, inflation, reduced output growth,
tax laws, and government regulations. Conse-
quently, they conclude that "an appropriate
policy response would call for a re-examination
ofgovernmental policies and other factors that
affect capital formation."
With relatively fewer resources allocated re-
cently to industrial capital investment, the
question arises regarding the possible overal-
location of resources to other sectors. Randall
Pozdena suggests that the beneficiary, to some
extent, may have been the housing sector. He
explores a paradox: housing prices rose relative
to most other prices in the economy between
1970 and 1980, prompting officials to argue
that housing had become "unaffordable" and
that more resources should be directed intothe industry, and yet the consumption of hous-
ing services continued to rise during this pe-
riod. Not only did the number of housing units
rise faster than the population, but the quality
of housing services also rose in terms of floor
area and amenities.
In attempting to unravel the paradox, Poz-
dena argues, "Inflation has been at the root of
many ofthe industry's problems-but this does
not mean that inflation has caused a crisis in
the form of unaffordable housing or unavail-
ability ofrental housing." He argues that hous-
ing costs, when properly measured, have fallen
relative to other prices despite the rise in hous-
ing prices. The widely observed trend away
from rental housing, including the conversion
of rental housing to owner-occupancy status,
meanwhile represents a natural consequence
of households' attempts to cope with the com-
bined impact of inflation and tax regulation.
Moreover, he argues that the combination
of inflation and special tax treatment tends to
alter relative rates of return between housing
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and other assets, and not simply within hous-
ing itself. "Thus, capital that otherwise would
have flowed into industrial uses frequently has
been attracted to housing instead. Thus the
true 'crisis' may be that too much-rather than
too little-housing is produced and consumed
in our economy."
Pozdena adds that further inflationary dis-
tortions occur because of the way that housing
is treated in the consumer-price index, which
confuses the costs of purchasing housing assets
with various costs involved in holding such as-
sets over time. Had an alternative "rental
equivalence" measure of housing costs been
used in the consumer price index, the index
probably would have stood more than eight
percent below its reported value in 1979. Thus
he concludes, "Considering the myriad public
and private programs and contracts which use
the CPI as an inflation index, such an over-
statement itself has introduced inflation-re-
lated distortions into the economy."